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Abstract 
A range of motives underlie energy related taxes. Typical reasons are collection of 
the ground/scarcity rent in resource extraction, taxation of monopoly profit and to 
collect public revenues. Energy taxes may also serve as pricing of infrastructure 
use and to adjust for imperfections in markets exploiting non-renewable energy 
resources. Most energy production and energy use bring along negative 
externalities, and taxes, tradable permits, green and white certificates are used to 
internalise such effects. However, policy is not straightforward because of the 
influence on cost and competition and concerns for regional employment, 
economic activity within certain industries, and any distributional effects. Tax 
discrimination, subsidies and regulations then undermine the efficiency of energy 
instruments. Hence, the taxes may deviate from theory. This report illuminates to 
what extent the energy related taxes may vary between western countries, and 
whether this variation can be explained by economic theory. We find that taxation 
varies tremendously among countries, and this variation indicates divergence 
between theory on efficient means and energy related policy.  
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1. Introduction 
Generally, the prices on energy goods in competitive markets reflect operating 
costs, shadow costs on capacity constraints, and the costs of capacity expansion. 
Taxes in energy markets are launched for several reasons, like out of revenue 
concerns and to correct for market failures and negative externalities. 
 
Since taxation in markets with no externalities normally influences on volumes, the 
society suffers an efficiency loss which should be compared to the need for funding 
of for instance governmental services. According to the novel article by Ramsey 
(1927), such taxes should be put on the least elastic commodity to minimize the 
efficiency losses. 
 
Some primary energy sources, as for instance crude oil, gas and coal, are scarce 
and exhaustible. Other primary energy sources, such as hydro, face decreasing 
returns to scale. Both resources then enjoy resource and scarcity rents. This is a 
perfect tax base for the government (Hotelling 1931, Karp and Newberry 1991). A 
tax on the scarcity rent does not cause any inefficiency since is has no impact on 
supplied volumes, and hence, does not correct for any externalities in production. 
 
In many of the primary energy markets, producer concentration is high, and abuse 
of market power reduces volumes and increases prices. In practice it is hard to 
separate monopoly profits and resource/ground rents. Then taxing of monopoly 
profits is a favourable option to many countries. 
 
Some energy uses are close information carriers for the use of infrastructure, such 
as roads and transmission networks for electricity transportation. In transmission 
networks, the pricing is direct via transmission tariffs, while for transport the 
payment for using the facilities is indirect and inaccurate through fuel prices (cf. 
that the energy use per kilometre varies between by the weight of the vehicle). 
 
Most energy production and use bring about negative externalities. These can 
include emissions of greenhouse gases (fossil fuels), emissions of sulphur and 
particulate matter (fossil and bio fuels), aesthetics and noise (wind power), 
destruction of nature (hydropower), and radiation (nuclear power). Producers and 
consumers do not normally consider such costs. Correction of negative 
externalities is then an important argument for taxing energy extraction/production 
and consumption (Pigou 1920, Sandmo 1975). A system of tradable emission 
permitted under a cap is a cost efficient alternative to externality taxes, given that 
the permit price equals the tax under the same externality cap.1 In a cost efficient 
approach, the environmental costs are exposed to all sources according to the stress 
they cause. Energy-related emissions will then fall through substitution between 
primary energy sources, the development and utilization of improved technologies 
in the conversion from primary to secondary energy, substitution between energy 
carriers, and more efficient technologies in energy consumption. However, 
correction of externalities may be complex, cf. the additivity problem of capturing 
complex negative externalities by taxation in Sandmo (1975). Substituting taxes on 
factor inputs (labour, capital) by taxes on externalities may also increase overall 
efficiency (the double dividend, Sandmo 1975, Goulder 1995b). In the economics 
literature, first-best cost efficient instruments in the presence of negative 
externalities have been extensively discussed (Diamond and Mirrles 1971, Sandmo 
1975, Ballard and Fullerton 1992). In the presence of positive external effects, e.g. 
from research and development, subsidies should be used to correct market failure. 
 
In the presence of imperfect information, taxes and subsidies may also be optimal 
instruments to correct such market failures. Further, what may seem as an optimal 
                                                     
1 Some of the literature highlights the differences between these instruments. See, for example, Bovenberg and de 
Mooij (1994). We do not go into these details here. Rather, we start out with the equality presumption as our focus is 
on other aspects of the implementation of these instruments. 
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domestic tax system can induce non-optimal solutions in a global context. If 
domestic taxation on emissions contributes to leakages and higher emissions 
abroad, exemptions could be made from what is an optimal solution for a closed 
economy. However, this is not straightforward since information on the relative 
elasticities for different sectors is needed to form the optimal discrimination 
schedule. 
 
Since taxes imply increasing costs, technology adjustments and structural changes, 
competition, local employment, and income distribution may be affected (Hoel 
1995). To circumvent these effects, policymakers introduce exceptions from and 
countermeasures to the first-best instruments (see examples for taxes in Norway; 
Bye, Hagem and Kverndokk 2007, and Bruvoll and Bye 2003). Tax exemptions for 
specific groups and energy end users, free allowances of emission permits and 
discrimination with respect to both taxation and responsibility under a cap-and-
trade system, reduced carbon tax rates and subsidized electricity contracts are all 
examples of divergence from the first-best solutions. A range of additional 
instruments are also introduced. These include renewable share requirements in 
energy production—so-called green certificates (Bye 2003, Menanteau et al. 
2003), requirements for demand side energy saving—referred to as white 
certificates (Bertoldi et al. 2006, Quiron 2006), cap-and-trade for greenhouse gas 
emissions (Hoel and Karp 2001) — also known as brown certificates, subsidies for 
renewable energy and standards for energy consuming appliances. 
 
In the literature, the partial effects of the introduction of different instruments are 
intensively discussed. The literature concludes that the partial effects of each 
instrument depend upon the elasticities of both demand and supply and the strength 
of the instrument. Some studies include the combination of taxes and subsidies 
(Goulder et al. 1999) while others discuss which instrument is best (Quiron 2006). 
Fischer and Newell (2008) assess different policies for reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions in the electricity sector and conclude that a portfolio mix of instruments 
may be optimal because of knowledge spillover. Bye and Bruvoll (2008) show that 
all of these instruments work as combinations of taxes and subsidies through 
market effects. In addition, since the effects of the instruments depend on the 
demand and supply side elasticities, any instrument changes the technological 
composition. This implies that the instruments’ effects depend on the sequence of 
introduction; they are path dependent. 
 
The extent of motives, instruments and possible exceptions from first-best-
instruments, opens for a jungle of political tools. The relationship between the 
theoretical basis and the (variation in) instruments is more difficult to detect the 
more instruments are launched to reach the same, or overlapping, goals. As 
referred above, there is a wide literature on partial effects and to some degree the 
effects of the combination of two instruments. But in practice, empirical analyses 
of the deviation of total instrument portfolio from theory are very difficult or 
impossible to conduct. As an indication of variation in the deviation between 
theory and practise, this report aims to illuminate to what degree instruments may 
vary between countries. The review shows that instruments vary significantly 
between countries and economic activities. This indicates divergence between 
theory on efficient means and energy related policy. The benefits from 
coordinating and simplifying the policies with the aim to approach the efficiency 
principle of one instrument per objective should be subject to further investigation. 
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2. The variation in tax levels 
During the 1960s and 1970s, taxes on energy were launched to capture 
governmental revenue. As energy price elasticities are generally low, these taxes 
may be characterized as Ramsey pricing. During the 1970s, OPEC I in 1973 and 
OPEC II in 1978, crude oil prices doubled twice, and the awareness of a possible 
scarcity of oil increased. The fall in crude oil prices in mid 1980s eased the 
introduction of taxes on petroleum products. At the same time, local pollution 
became an increasing concern, and oil products with heavy sulphur content were 
banned or heavily taxed. Pollution taxes met opposition, and earlier energy taxes 
were partly reduced to compensate. Hence, the apparent strengthening of 
environmental policy was partly a redefinition of energy taxes, and the total effect 
on the energy markets was considerably lower than the pure environmental policy 
promised. 
 
Figure 1 depicts and overview over the energy and environment tax revenues in 
European countries. Environmental taxes dominate in most countries, followed by 
transport taxes. The environmental taxes constituted the smallest revenues. Energy 
and environmental taxes amounted to 526 billion Euros in 2004, i.e. 7 percent of 
total tax revenues. 
 
Taxes vary significantly between countries and economic activities. The variation 
in transport taxes can be substantiated in differing infrastructure standards. 
Transport and infrastructure is also crucial policy variables to support regional 
settlement. Further, high density means high efficiency in public transports, while 
scattered population demands high roads cost per person kilometre. On the other 
hand, densely populated areas demand high standard roads, and land prices in 
central areas are high, see Chapter 4 for a further discussion of taxes on transport 
energy. Pollution taxes as share of total taxes vary between zero and 1 per cent, and 
the variation is relatively high among countries, see also Chapter 5. 
Figure 1. Revenues from energy and environmental taxes in percent of total revenues from 
taxes and social contributions. 2004. 
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Source: Eurostat (2008a). 
 
In countries rich on primary energy sources, for instance Norway, UK and the 
Netherlands, taxes on the resource and monopoly rent may override any other taxes 
on energy, whether taxes are based on the Ramsey principle2 or on externalities.  
                                                     
2 Ramsey pricing (Ramsey 1927) advocates taxes correlated to relative price elasticities, i.e. a high tax on 
commodities/input factors with low elasticity produces relatively high income and less product/factor distortions. 
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Norway is an obvious example of the importance of such taxes, see Figure 2. In 
2006, taxes on petroleum extraction constituted 76 percent of total energy related 
taxes in Norway. Taxes on electricity and road transport together constituted 21 per 
cent. Energy related taxes constituted 28 per cent of total taxes to the government, 
5 times the share in any other European country. This obviously reduces the need 
for extensive Ramsey taxation of energy commodities. In 2005, the oil and gas 
sector contributed to 35 percent of public revenues. 
Figure 2. Revenues from energy related taxes in Norway, 2006. Billion Euro 
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Source:  Statistics Norway. 
 
Figure 3 depicts the environmental taxes compared to GDP, including taxes from 
all activities with negative impact on the environment (taxes on transport, energy, 
pollution and resources). With the exception of Denmark, taxes vary between 2 and 
4 percent of GDP. Hence, despite the significant emphasis on environmental and 
energy regulations in terms of instruments, the importance to the overall economy 
may be limited. 
 
Figure 3. Total energy and environmental taxes as share of GDP. Percent. 2005 (2004 for EU25) 
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Source: Eurostat (2008b). 
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One may expect that increasing environmental awareness may increase the 
environmental taxes relative to GDP, cf. the EKC literature.3 When looking at the 
share of taxes over time, these have been fairly constant for the EU (15) countries, 
see Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Total environmental taxes as share of GDP. Percent 
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Source: Eurostat (2008b). 
 
I.e, taxes have increased nominally, and about at the pace of GDP growth. In 
Norway, the share has decreased significantly over the period. The reason for the 
reduced tax/GDP share is the extremely high growth of the Norwegian petroleum 
sector. The revenues from the taxes have remained fairly constant also for Norway. 
 
                                                     
3 The Environmental Kuznets Curve literature, hypothesizes that pollution first rise, then fall by increasing income. One 
of the reasons for the bending curve, is increasing environmental awareness and political acceptance for 
environmental regulations when income increases, see e.g. Stern (2004). 
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3. Ramsey taxes  
Electricity is a much used tax base in Europe. Some relevant theoretical arguments 
may apply; The total electricity bill should cover both power and infrastructure 
costs for transporting electricity. The tax could pay for the infrastructure. But most 
countries separate the payment of power and transports through the network. A 
second argument for a tax on electricity may be the need for revenue. Then the 
Ramsey principle advocates taxing the least elastic commodity. Electricity may be 
such a commodity.     Some argue that we should launch an electricity tax to 
capture negative externalities. The production of electricity may cause several 
environmental problems, but use of electricity does not (if we disregard any 
radiation). I.e. any taxes on the use of electricity must be regarded as Ramsey 
taxes. 
 
The electricity taxes vary significantly between countries, see Figure 5. For 
households the tax share of the price varies between 5-55 per cent. Denmark tops 
the electricity tax list, followed by Netherlands, Austria and Norway. On the low 
tax side we find United Kingdom, Portugal and Switzerland. One reason to the 
variation may be comparable differences in elasticities and the need for 
governmental income and priority of public funding. However, there is no reason 
to think that elasticities vary that much across countries. The tax base could also 
differ between countries, cfr for instance the Norwegian, UK and Dutch large 
revenue from the petroleum sector that reduces the need for supplementary taxes. 
 
Figure 5. Taxes on electricity in households. Percent of price. 2007 
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Source: OECD/IEA (2007). 
 
For industries, the taxes are generally lower, see Figure 6, varying from 2-22 per 
cent, lowest in Hungary and United Kingdom and highest in Belgium and Italy. 
Many manufacturing industries are fully exempt from electricity taxes. Unless this 
difference is substantiated in significantly higher demand elasticities than for 
households, this reveals an implicit relative subsidization of industries. The 
argument for this discrimination is often comparative advantages for industries. cfr 
Krugman (1996) for the relevance of this argument. 
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Figure 6. Taxes on electricity in industry. Percent of price. 2007 (2004 for Denmark) 
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Source: OECD/IEA (2007). 
 
The Nordic countries are more similar when it comes to public sector and welfare 
levels than European countries in general. Then one may also expect rather similar 
Ramsey taxes across countries. Electricity taxes are levied in all Nordic countries, 
with the exception of Iceland, see Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Taxes on electricity in Nordic countries. Euro/MWh. 2005 
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Source: Nordic Council of Ministers (2006). 
 
The rates vary greatly not only between the Nordic countries but also between 
different user groups within the same country. All countries have introduced 
special provisions for the industry, out of competitiveness concerns. 
 
In Denmark, the total average tax for all end uses is three times higher than in 
Sweden and six times higher than in Norway. Most production of electricity is 
thermal (coal based) and heavily polluting. This substantiates an argument that this 
is not a simple Ramsey tax but also contain a substantial CO2-tax element. 
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The tax also depends on the specific energy use differentiated on processes, and the 
industries face reduced rates if committing to increase energy efficiency. Hence, 
also here the basic tax includes a compensating CO2-element. The industry as a 
whole is completely exempted from the basic energy tax. 
 
Likewise, Swedish industry, agriculture, forestry and fisheries are not subject to the 
basic energy tax and receive major support in terms of reduced CO2 tax levels. 
Manufacturing industry faces low rates. Finland has lower energy taxes and does 
not grant energy and CO2 tax reduction programs on the same scale as the other 
countries. 
 
In Norway, a very low tax on industry reflects that power intensive industries, 
which constitute a large share of the industrial electricity end use, are totally 
exempted from electricity taxes. These exemptions apply for several production 
processes, such as electricity used for chemical reduction, electrolytic, 
metallurgical and mineralogical processes, that benefit the metal and cement 
industry, and the production of basic chemicals. Renewable projects and smaller 
power production sites are exempt from the electricity tax. 
 
For households’ natural gas taxes we find the same pattern for the distribution of 
taxes among countries in Europe, see Figure 8. Netherlands and Austria face the 
highest taxes, while United Kingdom, Portugal and Switzerland tax the least. It is 
not straightforward to see if there is any link between theoretical arguments and the 
great variation in taxes on natural gas. 
 
Figure 8. Taxes on natural gas in households. Percent of price. 2007 
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Source: OECD/IEA (2007). 
 
A closer look at the Nordic countries reveals that Norway, Sweden and Finland 
almost exclusively tax natural gas out of environmental reasons, see Figure 9, 
while almost 95 per cent of the Danish tax is a Ramsey tax, only 5 per cent a 
carbon tax. 
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Figure 9. Taxes on natural gas. Euro/Sm3 
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Source: Nordic Council of Ministers (2006). 
 
With respect to heating oil, high sulphur oils in industries are usually taxed low or 
not at all. Only 8 out of 26 countries tax such oils, see Figure 10. This may reflect 
that heavy fuel oil use is banned or regulated in other ways. Governments may also 
be reluctant to tax industries for competitive reasons, and consumer taxes seem to 
be more political acceptable when taxing pollution. The tax rates also vary much 
between countries. Differences in tax rates may be founded in the variation in local 
pollution, which is the main externality argument for taxing heavy fuel oils. Light 
fuel oils in the residential sector is taxed in most countries and much more than the 
heavy fuel oils. Some may argue that taxing the residential sector is consistent with 
the Diamond and Mirrlees argument4 about VAT, but since the reason for taxing 
fuel oil is the externality, this does not apply. 
Figure 10. Tax as share of oil product prices. Percent of oil product prices 
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Source: OECD/IEA (2006a). 
                                                     
4 Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) advocate that distortions should be confined to final consumption, leaving production 
undistorted, i.e. all taxes should be VAT only. 
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The Norwegian taxes, see Figure 11, illustrate an important aspect of taxation 
policy in most European countries. The relative taxes on light fuel and electricity 
are almost equal. The theoretical argument for electricity taxes may be the Ramsey 
principle, while taxes on fuel oils could be based both on a Ramsey argument and a 
correction of externalities. Gasoline and the diesel are more heavily taxed. Since 
light fuel oil creates both local and global externalities this seem odd. The reason 
may be that the price elasticity for transport fuels are lower than for heating oils, cf. 
the Ramsey argument, and a price on the use of road infrastructure. 
 
Figure 11. Fuel prices in Norway. USD/toe 
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Source: OECD/IEA (2005b). 
 
The electricity tax is much higher in the residential than in the industry sector. This 
may reflect that electricity has a much higher cost share than the other fuels in the 
industries. I.e., from a competition point of view, electricity taxes are kept low in 
industries. 
 
To summarize, this overview has shown significant differences in the, presumably, 
Ramsey motivated taxes across countries and sectors. Differences in taxes could 
theoretically be substantiated in varying elasticities and different need for public 
funding. Important reasons for the great variance could also be the impact of 
particular pressure groups, regional concerns, mixed incomprehensible and 
unsuccessful environmental measures, etc. Note that such concerns should, 
according to theory, be subject to specifically defined instruments. 
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4. Transport related taxes 
OECD (2004) claims that policies to reduce emissions from road transport appear 
to have little effect and entail relatively high costs. Nevertheless, most countries 
levy very high taxes on transport fuels. One obvious reason is that the tax serves as 
a price for the use of the transport infrastructure; another is that low price 
elasticities on transport fuels serve as a perfect revenue tax. According to 
Newberry (1982, 1988, 1990, 1998, 2004), the tax for road use in the purchaser 
price for gasoline or diesel often reflects the marginal cost of the infrastructure cost 
and may be well above the average cost of such use. Some countries use direct road 
pricing (turnpike roads), which works as a marginal cost of use, and some pay a 
standard annual fee for the use of roads (work as a funding fee when facing 
decreasing marginal cost of use). In many countries the earlier Ramsey tax on 
petrol and diesel are renamed to externality taxes. This implies that what appears to 
be a strengthening of environmental policy actually is just a conceptual 
redefinition. 
 
Generally, taxes in Europe are higher than in other OECD countries (e.g. US, 
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia), see Figure 12 and 13. One reason may be 
more expensive road infrastructure, another that higher income levels make it 
easier to handle high tax burdens, and a third reason is different emphasis on 
climate gas abatement; i.e. the CO2 tax element. 
 
The gasoline taxes are relatively higher than the taxes on diesel. The un-weighed 
European average is 62 percent for gasoline taxes, compared to 46 percent for 
diesel. One reason is that gasoline releases more CO2 than diesel. But still the tax 
measured per tonne of CO2 is higher for gasoline. Diesel, on the other hand, 
releases significant amounts of other pollutants, especially particulate matter.  
 
Figure 12. OECD automotive diesel prices and taxes, USD/litre, 2005 
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Source: OECD/IEA (2005b). 
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Figure 13. OECD unleaded gasoline prices and taxes, USD/litre, 2005 
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Source: OECD/IEA (2005b). 
 
Different CO2 policy explains some of the variation in transport fuel taxes, see 
Figure 14. Typically, European countries implement the highest taxes, while the 
lowest tax is in the US. Although the marginal cost of a unit emission is equal, 
different governments evaluate global warming differently. Different evaluation 
contributes to varying taxes. 
 
Figure 14. CO2 taxes on petrol. Euro/tonne of CO2 
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Figure 15. Taxes on diesel and petrol. Euro/1000 l. 
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Source: Nordic Council of Ministers (2006). 
 
Figure 15 shows the taxes subdivided into the basic energy taxes and CO2 taxes in 
northern Europe. Generally, the externality element is much lower than the revenue 
element. Again the taxes vary tremendously. It is not obvious whether revenue 
taxes reflect Ramsey taxation, or road pricing. Nash et al. (2002) compares costs 
and revenues associated with road transport, see Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. Road transport. Total costs and revenues*. Mill Euro. 1998 
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*: Costs: Infrastructure, air pollution, noise, global warming costs and external costs of accidents Revenues: Charges 
for infrastructure use, vehicle and fuel taxes. 
Source: OECD (2005), Nash et al. (2002). 
 
The social costs vary due to country specific characteristics, such as population 
density and traffic volumes. The figure shows that the social costs are comparable 
to the total revenue in most countries. This indicates that taxes are approximately 
right. On the other hand, increasing traffic incurs increasing marginal costs, by 
expanding the infrastructure, increasing congestion (the shadow price of capacity 
constraint) etc. Optimal taxation implies prices according to the marginal cost. 
Then average prices are too low to secure optimal investments in new capacity. 
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Regulation of emission intensities is one of the main instruments to control 
emissions from transport. Also, the chemical composition of motor fuels has been 
changed. E.g., the sulphur content of fuels is being reduced everywhere in the 
OECD area (OECD 2004). 
 
In addition to taxes on transport fuels, most countries implement additional 
measures, such as taxing car purchases, subsidizing railways, waterways, bio-fuels 
and fuel cells.  
 20 Statistics Norway
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5. Taxes on externalities 
Many countries have changed their taxes to place costs on emissions rather than on 
the energy source. When comes to CO2 taxes, they should principally be equal 
across sectors and countries, as the marginal damage is independent on the location 
of the emission source. In practise, CO2 taxes vary between countries, and within 
each country they vary across fuels and sectors. Particularly, large emission-
intensive sectors have obtained reduced rates or tax breaks (OECD 2004). A few 
countries apply specific carbon taxes, as part of the tax rate on petrol, recall Figure 
14. 
Norway was a pioneer in introducing a CO2 tax system already in 1991, and the 
rates are among the highest in the OECD. However, the Norwegian system is an 
example of impaired taxation, see Figure 17. 
Figure 17. Norwegian CO2-taxes by sector (line, 2008), and average for all national emissions 
(bars, 2006), Euro/ tonne CO2 
 
Source: Statistics Norway. 
 
Exemptions are given to the sectors where carbon taxes would have caused 
restructuring and downscaling of the activity, while sectors in which the taxes have 
small effects, face high rates (Bruvoll and Larsen 2006). The exemptions are given 
out of competitiveness concerns, such as energy-intensive process industries, 
international aviation, gas consumption in refineries on land, the fishing fleet and 
coastal traffic. Other face reduced rates, such as pulp and paper and fishmeal 
industry. 
 
Also the non-CO2 greenhouse gases should face the same marginal emission costs 
as CO2. Norway and Denmark have recently introduced such taxes, Norway in 
2003 (PFCs, HFCs) and Denmark in 2001 (PFCs). Non-CO2 greenhouse gas 
emissions are regulated by voluntary agreements, taxation and direct regulations. 
 
The use and level of SO2, NOx and VOC taxes also show a wide variation in levels, 
see Figure 18. Varying marginal damage of local pollution is a theoretical 
argument for differing taxes. However, the high taxes in Sweden and Norway 
relative to other countries indicate that other concerns dominate the tax levels. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
G
as
ol
in
e
Je
t p
ar
af
fin
Fu
el
 o
ils
, d
ie
se
l
LP
G
G
as
 fo
r h
ea
tin
g 
en
d 
us
es
G
as
, o
ffs
ho
re
H
ea
vy
 fu
el
 o
ils
Fu
el
 o
ils
, d
ie
se
l, 
of
fs
ho
re
H
ea
vy
 fu
el
 o
ils
, o
ffs
ho
re
Fu
el
 o
ils
, d
ie
se
l, 
re
du
ce
d 
ra
te
H
ea
vy
 fu
el
 o
ils
, r
ed
uc
ed
 ra
te
U
se
 o
f c
oa
l a
nd
 c
ok
e
Fo
re
ig
n 
av
ia
tio
n
Fi
sh
in
g-
fo
re
ig
n 
sh
ip
pi
ng
G
as
 m
ai
nl
an
d
Average for all national CO2 emissions
 Taxing energy – why and how? Reports 2008/28
Figure 18. Taxes on SO2 and NOx. Euro/tonne 
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Source: OECD (2004). 
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6. Subsidies 
6.1. Renewable energy shares 
In most countries, stimulation of renewable energy sources plays a part of 
environmental policy, as alternative to policies directed at reducing the emissions 
from fossil energy. When looking into the spread and multitude of pollution related 
taxes, it is useful to bear in mind that the share of renewable energy of total energy 
production varies between countries, see Figure 19. In general, the share is less 
than 5 percent of total energy supply. The highest shares are found in Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden and New Zealand - all relatively small countries both with 
respect to population and energy use, and with respect to natural energy resources. 
Iceland is exceptional in its access to geothermal energy resources. Norway differs 
from other IEA countries in the domination of hydropower, as it contributes to 99 
percent of the electricity production. Thus, energy demand in stationary use is also 
relatively clean, while like for other countries of course energy use for 
transportation is mostly fossil fuel. New Zealand and Canada are examples of 
hydropower intensive countries outside Europe. Hence, the externality element in 
the overall environment and energy taxes should vary accordingly between 
countries. 
 
Figure 19. Renewable Energy as percentage of total supply, 2005 
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Source: OECD/IEA (2007).  
 
6.2. Direct subsidies 
The OECD measures subsidies in terms of grants or soft loans to producers or 
consumers of energy, market price support, differential tax rates on different fuels 
and publicly funded research and development programs (OECD 2005). Subsidies 
to energy producers usually take the form of grants, loans and tax exemptions. 
Over 40 percent of US subsidies go to tax exemptions that lower the cost of energy 
production. A review of harmful subsidies in OECD concludes that there have been 
no systematic efforts to assess the environmental impacts of manufacturing 
subsidies (OECD 2005). The existing estimates of support to both energy 
production and consumption are thus incomplete and approximate. 
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Figure 20. Support per tonne of coal production in selected OECD countries. USD/toe 
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Source: OECD (2005). 
 
About a third of the producer energy subsidies support coal production (OECD 
2005), for which there are relatively good estimates. The coal support in some 
selected OECD countries was nearly halved from 1990 to 2000. This was mainly 
due to reduced production, hence subsidies per tonne of coal production remained 
rather stable, see Figure 20. The subsidization of the coal industry is a notable self-
contradiction to the theoretical foundation for Ramsey taxation and correction of 
externalities. For the coal industry, the well-organized labour force in the coal 
industry is an important explanation. 
 
OECD concludes that the more environmentally damaging sectors are, the greater 
recipients of government support than the cleaner sectors, and the most damaging 
sectors are the old and declining sectors of the economy. Table 1 provides 
estimates from OECD on the level of support, measured by the effective rate of 
protection (the ratio of the difference between the assisted and unassisted value 
added over the unassisted value) in the two most (leather and metal production) 
and least (electronic and transport equipment) pollution intensive industries as 
rated by the World Bank (OECD 2005). 
 
Table 1. The level of support in the two most pollution-intensive and the two least pollution-
intensive industries as classified by the World Bank (2000). 
Effective rate of protection Aus NZ Can USA GBR Deu Dnk Swe Fin REU Ave-rage
Transport equip (clean) 0.04 -0.08 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.007
Electronic equip (clean) 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.040
Leather prds (polluting) 0.85 0.24 0.30 0.21 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.191
Metals (polluting) 0.41 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.086
Source: OECD (2005). 
 
The subsidies of polluting industries increase the need for countermeasures against 
externalities. Instead of reducing the harmful subsidies, new subsidies are given to 
renewables to increase competitiveness of non-polluting energy production, 
relative to e.g. the coal industry. The costs of such abatement policies seem to be 
higher than direct regulation, and indirect subsidies are inconsistent with theory. 
Subsidies are optimal only if the use and development of the subsidized 
technologies have positive side-effects in themselves, i.e. in terms of learning by 
doing. As shown in Bye and Bruvoll (2008) both green and white certificates (see 
Chapter 8 and 9) include subsidy elements. 
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OECD (2004) claims that the strategies to stimulate renewable sources of energy 
have involved abatement costs that are far higher than alternative programs to 
reduce CO2 emissions. This is illustrated in Table 2, that shows a great variation in 
the costs per tonne of CO2 depending upon type of renewable energy. The costs per 
tonne of CO2 far overreach the CO2 taxes and the prices in the permit markets of 
about 20 Euro, see Chapter 7. 
Table 2. Abatement costs of measures promoting renewable sources of energy, Euro per 
tonne of CO2 
  Biomass Photovoltaic Dams Geothermic Wind
Austria 341 1454  114 134
Belgium – Wallonia 63 125  125
Belgium – Flanders 79 79 79  79
Czech Republic 64 153   
Denmark 149   91
Finland 20   52
France 86 328 155  154
Germany 195 1217 118 163 167
Greece   60
Hungary   147
Ireland 62 74  32
Italy 200 200 200 200 200
Luxembourg 63 1265 63  63
Netherlands 87 87 87  87
Portugal 58 938 83  112
Spain 84 910 75  65
Sweden 25 25 25  73
United Kingdom 117 117 117 117 117
United States 39   39
Source: OECD (2004), different years; based on country surveys. 
 
The Nordic countries make widespread use of support schemes for renewable 
energy sources, including green certificates, investment aid, tax 
exemptions/reductions/refunds and direct support mechanisms. 
 
In Denmark, several subsidy schemes have been used to support renewable energy 
sources; biogas plants, solar heat installations, heat pumps and bio fuel boilers 
receive investment support. Windmills no longer receive investment subsidies. The 
subsidy constituted up to 30 percent of the construction costs (in 2002, Nordic 
Council of Ministers 2006). The production subsidy is now an extra charge paid by 
the consumers and is no longer financed over the public budget. Windmills receive 
minimum prices, combined heat and power plants using natural gas are granted 
price supplements, and biogas, natural gas and waste are granted production 
subsidies. 
 
The Swedish goal is to increase new renewable energy by 17 TWh by 2016 
(Ministry of Sustainable Development 2006). The energy tax legislation excludes 
biofuels from all energy related taxes. In addition, investment subsidies are granted 
for renewable energy sources, windmills included. Combined heat and power 
plants are exempted from energy taxes, and partially exempted from the CO2 tax. 
The green certificate system was introduced in 2003. This is a production subsidy 
system for renewable energy. Energy intensive industries are not obliged to 
participate in the system. 
 
In Finland, electricity production from green fuels and green energy technologies is 
granted CO2 tax refunds, and subsidies are given to investment in green 
technologies. The highest support is given to wind power and electricity produced 
from forest chips. Investment subsidies are also provided.  
The Norwegian support scheme for renewables has since 2001 been managed by 
the government agency Enova SF. The main goal is an increase of 30 TWh in 
renewable energy sources and energy saving in 2016 compared to 2001 (Ministry 
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of Environment 2007). Enova grants subsidies to wind energy projects, other 
renewable energy projects and energy savings projects to organizations applying 
for such projects. Enova's activities are funded by a dedicated levy on the 
transmission tariff for electricity and from the state budget. Wind power has 
received most funding, then heat distribution and development bioenergy. Further 
support is coming through research support from NVE. Other technologies, such as 
solar and water heating and new hydropower projects, have also been supported. 
Funds are also granted for research and development concerning energy and oil 
production and consumption. 
 
6.3. Subsidies for research and development 
The government budgets for energy R&D vary considerably between countries, see 
Figure 21. The reason may be the varying shares of different energy sources within 
the economies. About 40 percent of the R&D budget in the IEA countries is 
devoted to nuclear technologies, and 11 percent to fossil fuels. Public R&D in 
renewable technologies and energy efficiency amounts to 12 percent each. 
 
Figure 21. Nominal R&D budget as a percentage of nominal GDP, percent 
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Source: OECD/IEA (2006a). 
 
In Norway, several gas-fired power stations are licensed. These will increase CO2 
emissions, and increased efforts to develop technologies for CO2 capture have 
become important in Norwegian energy policy. The governmental agency 
Gassnova SF was established in 2008, to promote the development of technological 
solutions for CCS. 
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7. The permission market 
Carbon trading gains in scope in many countries, this comprises both single-
country systems and international harmonized markets. A cap and trade system for 
greenhouse gases is comparable in distribution of costs to a tax system. Since the 
cap introduces a shadow price on the restriction it serves as a tax. The more 
countries joining the markets, the more cost efficient is compliance at given 
emission caps. A well functioning trading market secures equal marginal 
abatement costs for those participating in the system. 
 
In the first phase (2005-2007) the European Emission Trading (EU ETS) scheme 
only covered 38 per cent of total greenhouse gases – and 45 per cent of CO2 
emissions within EU countries. In the second phase (2008-2012) the market has 
increased to include approximately 50 per cent of greenhouse gases.  EU ETS 
represents a multi-country scheme for climate gas emissions. Still, the market only 
covers large manufacturing industries and the power sector, i.e. cost efficiency is 
not secured. There is no link to other international permit markets and the link to 
Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) with developing countries and Joint 
Implementation (JI) mechanisms (with Annex I countries) are limited.  In the first 
phase existing emitters got approximately 95 per cent free allowances and in the 
second phase they get 90 per cent for free. These allowances are “restricted”, as 
they are not free tradable goods without consequences for the future allocation of 
free allowances (updated grandfathering). This allocation scheme then influences 
the efficiency - the benefit of reducing capacity or introducing new energy saving 
technology should include the discounted future loss of the reduced free 
allowances. Given free trade of allowances, grandfathering may produce efficient 
second hand allocations (Böhringer and Lange 2005, Böhringer and Rosendahl 
2007). New installations also get free allowances based on benchmarking, and 
closure of firms implies no allocation the next year. 
 
The Norwegian permit system is linked to the EU ETS system. However, in some 
respects the Norwegian system differs, as i) more emitters are included, ii) the 
amount of auction based permits is larger, iii) free allowances will be phased out, 
iv) all emitters not included in the permit system are taxed on emissions, v) 
emitters that are taxed may opt-in to the permit system, and vi) gas power plants   
receive allowances but are committed to CCS in the future. 
 
At first (2006), the EU ETS produced a high price, see Figure 22. The market 
seemed to assume that the system put a real restriction on the total emissions. The 
allocation of permits was based upon firms’ own projections of necessary emission 
permits and the number of allowances was reduced by five percent compared to the 
projections. This was expected to push prices upwards. It also turned out that the 
energy intensive industry actually withheld their excess allowances, pushing prices 
further upwards. As both projections and allowances turned ot to be all too high, 
market prices plunged to almost one half in 2006. At the end of 2006, the market 
became even more aware of the excess amount of permits, the industry started to 
sell some of the withheld permits, and the market almost collapsed. 
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Figure 22. The permit price on the EU ETS. Euro/ton CO2 
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Source: NordPool Exchange and EEX. 
 
In the second phase, the commission reduced the number of free allowances. This 
was supposed to tighten the market and increase the price. As the graph shows this 
has not happened so far. However, the NordPool exchange and EEX notify also 
futures and forwards for in the EU ETS market. For December 2008 the price is 
expected to rise to 23 Euro/EUA (European Allowance). In the longer future – up 
to 2012 - the price drops again to approximately 17 Euro/EUA. I.e. the price seems 
to stabilise at a level close to the early 2006 level (between 15-23 Euro/EUA). 
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8. The green certificate market 
During the past years, interest in the green certificate system has increased, and 
markets have been established in the UK, Italy, Belgium and Sweden. Several 
countries plan to implement the system. In 2001, EU introduced the aim to attain a 
share of renewable energy consumption of 20 percent by 2020, and the 
introduction of green certificates is one means to reach this goal. Norway has 
considered joining the Swedish green certificate market, but has turned this down 
out of cost concerns. 
 
A green certificate is a proof of the green origin of an amount of energy produced, 
see Bye and Bruvoll (2008)5. For each unit of secondary energy produced by a 
renewable primary energy carrier the government issues a green certificate to the 
producer. The consumer has to purchase a number of certificates proportional to 
energy consumption (i.e. the face a tax on their energy use). This creates a market 
for the green energy certificates. The producers of green energy harvest a 
certificate price in the certificate market additional to the energy price in the energy 
market, which increases the profitability of producing energy from green 
technologies (i.e. the harvest a subsidy which is a negative tax). An advantage of 
such an instrument over a simple lump sum subsidy is that the certificate market 
will realize a cost efficient investment for capacity expansion under the green 
energy production share constraint. This may be comparable to an auction based 
subsidy system. The subsidy element may be founded in the positive externality 
related to learning by doing (see also Bye, Greaker and Rosendahl 2002). 
 
The designs and experiences vary between the markets. The system requires a 
definition of the relevant technology space. The green commitment share and the 
definition of relevant green technologies is a governmental issue. In the European 
countries that have introduced green certificate systems, definitions and scope of 
technologies differ tremendously. 
 
The Dutch market was the first one to introduce green certificates, but later 
substituted this with other systems. Italian certificates are issued only for new 
production. The UK market puts large credit risks on investors and plant 
developers, resulting in problems in financing. In both UK and Italy, wind power is 
expected to deliver most of the certificates the coming years (2005), solid waste 
and hydro power in Italy and biomass in Sweden. 
 
Sweden implemented an electricity certificate system in 2003, see Figure 23. The 
Swedish system had some start-up problems, as large amounts of certificates were 
in store. Later the market increased for some months but now face very small 
volumes again. The certificate price started at 250 SEK/ ECS decreased to 150 
SEK/ECS when volume rised and the increased again to 250 SEK/ECS and 
volumes dropped. Until now, the system is believed to have increased the 
production of new renewable energy by 5 TWh (Ministry of Sustainable 
Development 2007). The ambitions are to increase new renewable technologies 
with 12 TWh over the period 2007-2016. 
 
                                                     
5 Different kinds of renewable energy sources are classified as green; see COM (2000), Voogt et al. (2000), Voogt et 
al. (2006), Amundsen and Mortensen (2001), and Jensen and Skytte (2002). Brekke and Bye (2003) discuss whether 
we can characterize any energy source as green. 
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Figure 23. Price (right axis) and volumes (left axis) in the Swedish certificate system. March 
2003- december 2007 
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Source: NordPool. 
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9. The white certificate market 
While green certificates deal with the supply side, white certificates concern energy 
savings on the demand side. A white certificate system may impose a restriction on 
total allowable energy consumption for separate consumer groups, which 
introduces a shadow price on the restriction, i.e. a tax. In practice, the restrictions 
are imposed on distribution companies or the energy suppliers; see Bye and 
Bruvoll (2008). These invest in energy efficiency measures on behalf of their 
consumers, and consumers eventually pay through additions to energy tariffs. 
 
Several European countries have implemented white certificate schemes or 
seriously consider doing so. Italy opened their market in 2004. The Italian scheme 
has a target expressed in primary energy. The aim was to save 7 TWh, which is 
considered a small portion of total consumption. The aim is to increase the scope of 
the system over time. France opened a white certificate system a year later, in 
2006. The goal is to reduce energy use by a total of 54 TWh over three years (cf. a 
total yearly consumption of 270 TWh). A penalty for not complying (0.02 Euro in 
France) implicitly defines the maximal price and "abatement cost". United 
Kingdom has combined its obligation system for energy savings with the 
possibility to trade obligations and savings. All electricity and gas suppliers must 
achieve a saving by assisting their customers to take energy-efficiency measures in 
their homes. The aim is partly to benefit low-income households. Suppliers with at 
least 50.000 domestic customers are eligible for an obligation. The Energy 
Efficiency Commitment 1 (2002-2005) program required that all electricity and gas 
suppliers with 15.000 or more domestic customers must achieve a combined 
energy saving of 62 TWh by 2005 by assisting their customers to take energy-
efficiency measures in their homes: suppliers must achieve at least half of their 
energy savings in households on income-related benefits and tax credits. In the 
current (2005-2008) EEC 2, energy saving targets were raised to 130 TWh 
suppliers, and here suppliers with at least 50.000 domestic customers (including 
affiliated licenses) are eligible for an obligation. Denmark and the Netherlands are 
seriously considering introduction of a white certificate scheme in the near future. 
 
Generally, attempts to improvements of energy efficiency have proven to increase 
efficiency and reduce emissions in countries with low energy efficiency ex ante, 
such as countries in transition, while regulatory measures and subsidies targeting 
specific means to save energy in countries with high energy efficiency to begin 
with have proved costly (OECD 2004). 
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10. Other regulations 
Command and control regulation is the main instrument to reduce local/regional 
energy related pollutants (such as SO2, NOx, VOC) from large sources in most 
OECD countries (introduces a shadow price on the restriction – i.e. a tax). Given 
that the marginal costs differ between sources and localities, the marginal 
abatement costs also differ, i.e. a uniform regulation introduces differences in 
shadow prices (comparable to differences in taxes). In practice, the polluters have 
significant say in designing regulations and hence attain exemptions for existing 
sources (OECD 2004). Such political pressure proves to distort efficient taxation 
that would secure equal marginal abatement costs per unit pollutants over different 
sources, local damage variation disregarded. Consequently, the marginal abatement 
costs differ significantly between sources.  
This may be illustrated by the varying marginal abatement costs under the US 
Clean Air Act 1979-1985, see Table 3. A volume regulation on these emission 
sources would generally not coincide with a uniform marginal cost regulation (for 
instant a uniform tax). A volume regulation would most probably imply a 
tremendous variation in the implicit tax among emission sources. 
Table 3. Marginal abatement costs under the US Clean Air Act, USD/tonne 
 Partuculate matter Sulphur dioxide Nitrogen dioxide
Beverages 92 250 14300
Paper 65 400 1500
Pulp 30 175 800
Coal 22 2300 150
Rubber 57 1150 400
Machinery 143 850 600
Ships 51 870 2700
Source: OECD (2004). 
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11. Voluntary agreements 
Compared to Pigovian taxes, voluntary agreements are preferable the polluters. 
Under a voluntary agreement, the polluters only carry the abatement costs, while 
they do not pay for the remaining emissions. Generally, these have been found to 
be costly or ineffective (OECD 2004). In a review of OECD countries, OECD 
(2004, p. 93) specifically recommended several countries, among them Norway, to 
end voluntary agreements. 
 
In Norway, voluntary commitments are used for parts of the process industry that is 
not covered by the trading system or CO2 taxes, particularly for other climate gases 
than CO2. The government has expressed that emission trading is preferred to 
voluntary agreements as long-term instruments. 
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12. Summary and conclusions 
The reason for levying energy related taxes are public revenue concerns, harvesting 
of resource and ground rents and capturing some of the monopoly profits (Bye, 
2007), indirect pricing of highly correlated commodities (for instance the use of 
transport infrastructure which correlates to petrol fuel use), corrections of negative 
externalities, i.e. climate change and local air pollution, and energy security, 
 
This review shows that taxes vary significantly between countries and economic 
activities. Average taxes on energy and environment constituted approximately 7 
per cent of total tax revenue in EU15 in 2004, varying from 5 to 12 per cent. Of 
these, the pure energy taxes constituted 5 per cent, the payment for traffic 
infrastructure use 2 per cent and taxes on pollution 0.3 per cent. As a share of GDP, 
total environmental taxes were 2.7 per cent in 2004. The non-EU member Norway 
is an outlier. Total energy taxes constitute 28 per cent of total tax revenues, due to 
an extraordinary tax on the resource rent on petroleum extraction and hydro power 
production. 
 
Also the specific taxes on electricity, natural gas and heating oils vary much 
between the countries. The electricity tax works as a Ramsey tax – the price 
elasticity for electricity in households is low and revenue collection consequently 
high. This then seems as a lost opportunity for revenue collection for many 
countries. The average electricity taxes are generally much lower in industries than 
for households. This may be consistent with the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) 
principle, advocating that distortions should be confined to final consumption, 
leaving production undistorted. Taxes on natural gas and heating fuels follow the 
same pattern. While electricity taxes may be characterized as Ramsey taxes, taxes 
on natural gas may be used both of Ramsey and environmental concerns. Industries 
are favoured due to competitive arguments. 
 
Taxes on transport fuels are 2-4 times the commodity price. The arguments may be 
threefold; the tax serves as a price of the use of road infrastructure, the 
environmental element is large (greenhouse gases), and the price elasticity on road 
transport is relatively low, i.e. this is a well suited commodity to tax for revenue 
purposes (Ramsey tax). Studies indicate that the tax on transport fuels covers 
average cost in most countries, i.e. the fuels are probably not taxed sufficiently to 
cover increasing marginal costs. 
 
The ETS market for emission allowances in Europe adds to the general tax systems 
in the pricing of greenhouse gases. However, so far the market has not been 
restricted enough to really price these emissions. The futures market for the 
allowances, however, price these emissions high compared to average taxes on 
greenhouse gases in the EU countries. Discrimination with respect to allocation of 
free allowances and indirect restriction on tradability cause market inefficiencies. 
Hence, a combination of taxes and tradable permits do not necessarily secure 
efficiency in the greenhouse emissions reductions. 
 
Lately, both green and white certificates have been introduced in several European 
countries. Green certificates put a restriction on the supply side and white 
certificates put a restriction on the demand side of the energy market. They both 
then introduce a shadow price on the restriction, which serves just as a tax in the 
market (through market effects they also introduce a subsidy element). So far these 
markets cover just smaller parts of the European energy market. 
 
Different energy production patterns, the general production structure and the 
political emphasis on distributional effects bring along extensive variation in 
energy taxation policies across countries. Further, conflicting interests, income 
distribution and environmental concerns cause exemptions, tax discounts and 
subsidies to particular groups, and form the background for the development of a 
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portfolio of instruments to solve a limited set of problems. The desire to preserve 
employment, particularly in energy-intensive industries, and regional concerns, are 
the main reasons behind reduced rates and exemptions of carbon taxes in industry 
(OECD 2004). There is also a great variation between industries. The free 
allocation of allowances in the emission trading schemes reflects industry 
competition concerns and regional and social policy objectives. Subsidies, green 
certificates and white certificates in combination of discriminatory regimes all 
bring along complex combinations of implicit taxes and subsidies in the energy 
sector. Just as tax regimes vary among the European countries, the introduction of 
and the scope of new instruments also do. 
 
Bye and Bruvoll (2008) show that the portfolio of economic instruments are in 
principle simple combinations of taxes and subsidies, and pose the question 
whether it is time to launch an energy instrument reform. This review of the 
practical implementation of energy related policies across countries supports this, 
as it indicates divergence between theory on efficient means and energy policy. 
The benefits from coordinating and simplifying the policies with the aim to 
approach the efficiency principle of one instrument per objective should be subject 
to further investigation. 
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